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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from a decision of the district court reversing on intermediate appeal the
Magistrate's characterization in a decree of divorce that a parcel of real property was community
property. Appellant Susan Kraly Ahearn (hereinafter "Ahearn") appeals the decision of District
Judge, Steve Yerby wherein the district court concluded that 60 acres of land deeded to Ahearn
.and her husband, Stanely Kraly, as husband and wife, during their marriage, was Kraly's
separate property. Ahearn further appeals the decision of Magistrate Judge, Justin W. Julian that,
upon finding the acreage community property, Kraly was entitled to reimbursement of the
purchase price of the property.
B.

Statement of Facts & Course of Proceedings

Stanley Kraly and Susan Ahearn were married on April 12, 2003 in the Stuart, Florida.
Shortly after their marriage, Kraly sold his primary residence in Palm City, Florida which
resulted in net sale proceeds in excess of $536,000. Following the sale, Kraly used a portion of
the proceeds from his Palm City residence to purchase sixty acres of unimproved property
located near Rapid Lightning Creek Road in Bonner County, Idaho, for $167,500. The warranty
deed conveying the property conveyed to "Stan Kraly and Susan Kraly, Husband and Wife".
Kraly purchased other property, also in Idaho, taking that property solely in his own name.
On October 5, 2004 Kraly filed a complaint for divorce based upon the grounds of
irreconcilable differences. (R., pp. 10-11.)
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Trial on the issues of the distribution of the parties' property located within the State of
Idaho was held on March I, 2006. (See, Transcript, generally.) The only witnesses to testify at
trial were the parties themselves. (Id.)
At the conclusion of the trial the Magistrate entered a written Final Decree of Divorce.
(R., pp. 105-109.) In its written findings, the Magistrate stated:
The Court finds that the real property located in Bonner County, Idaho consisting of 60
acres on Rapid Lightning Creek Road is a community asset. The Court further finds that
the Plaintiff proved by clear and convincing evidence that the source of funds to entirely
purchase the property was from the Plaintiffs separate property, and there was no
evidence of any intent by the Plaintiff to gift his separate property purchase monies to the
Defendant by the warranty deed alone. The Plaintiff successfully traced and proved his
separate property investment in the asset in the amount of $1(57,500. The $167,500
purchase price of the real property shall be awarded to the Plaintiff as his sole and
separate property. Any enhanced value of the real property in excess of $167,500
(representing Plaintiffs separate property interest) shall be a community property asset
and shared equally by the parties;·
(R., p. 108.)
On appeal from the Magistrate's Division of the district court the district court reversed
the Magistrate's characterization of the Lightning Creek as "community property" and awarded
the property, along with any natural enhancement in the value of the property to Kraly as his
separate property. (R., pp. 140-146.)
OnJanuary 16, 2008, Ahearn-timely filed this appeal. (R., pp.148-151.)
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ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the district court err in setting aside the Magistrate's finding that the Lightning Creek
property was community property and characterizing the property as Kraly' s separate
property?

2.

Upon its finding that the Lightning Creek property was community property, did the
Magistrate err in concluding that Kraly was entitled to reimbursement of his separate
property funds used to purchase the property?

3.

Notwithstanding the characterization of the Lightning Creek property as either the
community property ofKraly and Ahearn, as husband and wife, or_Kraly's separate
property, is Kraly estopped from challenging on appeal the Magistrate's distribution of
the asset since the Magistrate's distribution was consistent with Kraly's sworn admission
at trial as to the nature and extent of Ahearn's interest in the property?

3
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ARGUMENT
I.

The district court erred in characterizing the Lightning Creek property as Kraly' s separate
property as there was substantial competent evidence at trial to find the presumptive
character of the property as community property unrebutted.
A.

Introduction

On appeal from the Magistrate's Division, the district court reversed the Magistrate's
characterization of the Lightning Creek property as community property holding that the
property was Kraly's separate property. (R., pp. 5-10.) The district court's reasoning for its
decision was based upon two findings of the Magistrate: (1) that Kraly had purchased the
acreage using proceeds from his separate property thereby rebutting the community property
presumption, and (2) Ahearn' s name on the deed cannot serve to create a community interest in
the property. (R., pp. 5-8.) In its reasoning the district court erred.

B.

Standard of Review

In general, a magistrate judge's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they
are clearly erroneous such that they are not based upon substantial and competent evidence.
Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 152 P.3d 544 (2007). On appeal, appellate courts will
exercise free review over the magistrate's conclusions of law. Id.
Characterization of property as separate or community property involves mixed questions
oflaw and fact. Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571,579 P.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1988). Moreto--the point,
an appellate court, if there is competent evidence ofa trial court's characterization of.property as
either separate or community, is bound by the findings of the trial court.
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[T]his court is confronted with the findings of fact of the trial court, and with the general
rule that a finding of a trial court that property is either separate or community, when
supported by competent evidence, is binding and conclusive upon the appellate court. If it
is based upon conflicting evidence or upon evidence which is subject to different
inferences, we will not disturb such a finding on appeal. A fortiori where that finding is
based upon evidence which is neither conflicting nor controverted at trial, it must be
upheld.
Cargill v. Hancock, 92 Idaho 460,444 P.2d 421 (1968) (citations omitted).

It is a well settled principle ofidaho's community property Jaw that property acquired
after the date of marriage, is presumed to be community property. Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53,
44 P.3d 1108 (2002).
In the case at bar, the Magistrate found the Lightning Creek property to be a community
asset. "In this case this is a piece of community property. We know that because it was acquired
during the marriage. So it's community property." (Tr., p. 177, Ls.15-17; see, also, Tr., p. 181,
Ls. 7, 14-18.) The record in this case clearly supports the presumptive characterization of
community property, as the parties were married on April, 12, 2003, and property was purchased
in March of 2004.
This presumptive characterization can be rebutted, but the party asserting the
characterization of the property as being separate bears the burden of proof. Reed, 137 Idaho 53,
44P.3d1108. Theassertingparty can only carry this bur..den by proving the separate nature of
the asset with a reasonably certain and particular level of proof. Id. Kraly will argue on appeal
that he met his burden of proof by establishing the source of the funds purchasing the property as
his separate property. The evidence adduced at trial included documentary evidence of the wire
transfer of the purchasing funds, and testimony regarding the intent of the parties when they
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purchased the property. The record also includes the recorded deed for the property, naming
"Stan Kraly and Susan Kraly, Husband and Wife" as fee simple owners. The deed was admitted
into evidence, without objection from Kraly. (Def. Ex. "A"; see also Tr., p. 91, L. I - p. 92, L.
23.)
Based upon the proffered testimony and documentary evidence, the Magistrate
characterized the acreage as a community asset; clearly the trial court found Kraly did not meet
his burden of proof as to the separate nature of the property. The acreage unequivocally is
subject to the presumption of community characterization, and the trial court further
characterized the property as belonging to the community after considering evidence subject to
differing inferences. Applying the standard of review as stated by the Cargill Court, the trial
court's characterization of the property as a community asset must stand upon appeal. Further, as
argued infra, the recorded deed is dispositive of the community nature of the Lightning Creek
property.
C.

The recorded deed is unambiguous and therefore dispositive as to the community
nature of the property.

In Hall v.Hall,116 Idaho 483, 77 P.2d 255 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court ruled on
whether parol evidence is admissible to prove ~he parties intention when a deed unambiguously
recites the transfer of the disputed property to a husband and wife.
Where possible, the cou1i should give effect to the intention of the parties to a deed.
Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 450 P.2d 990 (1969). Where the language of a deed is
plain and unambiguous the intention of the parties must be determined from the deed
itself, and parol evidence is not admissible to show intent. Id. Oral and written statements
are generally inadmissible to contradict or vary unambiguous terms contained in a deed.

6

French v. Brinkman, 60 Cal.2d 54 7, 35 Cal.Rptr. 289, 387 P .2d 1 (1963); Neeley v.
Kelsch, 600 P .2d 979 (Utah 1979).
Hall, 116 Idaho at 484.
The factual scenario in Hall involved a transfer of ranch property in Horseshoe Bend,
Idaho from the husband's grandparents to the husband and wife. Specifically, the deed in
question in the Hall read as follows:
For Value Received, THOMAS R. FAULL, SR., also known as Thomas R. Faull, Thos.
R. Faull, Thomas Richard Faull, Sr., and Thomas Faull and FLORA M. FAULL, husband
and wife, grantors, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto ANTHONY M. HALL
and CAROLYN S. HALL, husband and wife, the grantees, ... the following described
premises ....

Hall, 116 Idaho at 484.
The issue in Hall was determining whether the grandparents had gifted the excess value
of the ranch above the purchase price to their grandson as his separate property; as the Halls had.
purchased the property with $60,000 of community funds and the husband's grandmother
testified at trial the property was worth $100,000 when sold. Id. The case was argued to the
Court of Appeals, which enumerated the principle of not admitting parol evidence contradicting
an unambiguous deed. Hall v. Hall, 112 Idaho 641, 734 P.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1987). Upon
petition for review the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. Hall v. Hall, 116
Idaho 483, 777 P.2d 255.
The Supreme Court has continued to follow the Hall decision in Bliss v. Bliss, calling the
policies underlying Hall and similar cases "well founded and enduring." Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho
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170, 898 P .2d 1081. In Bliss, the Supreme Court ruled evidence of a husband contradicting an
unambiguous deed conveying property to his wife as her separate property was not admissible.
The record in the case at bar reflects the recorded Warranty Deed as expressly granting a
fee simple estate to the Appellant and the Respondent as husband and wife. The recorded deed
was admitted into evidence, without objection or argument as to whether the express language of
the deed was ambiguous. (Tr., p. 91, L. l - p.92, L. 23.) The language on the deed is as follows:
For Value Received LARRY LITTLE, A Married Man as his sole and separate
property and DONALD CHARLES, A Single Man, the grantors, do hereby grant,
bargain, sell and convey unto STAN KRALY and SUSAN KRAL Y, Husband and
Wife, the grantees whose current address is 4300 BAYSHORE TERRACE, STUART,
FL 34997, the following premises, in Bonner County Idaho ...
(Def. Ex. "A")
Kraly has claimed from the beginning the characterization of the Lightning Creek
property was wholly separate property. Kraly relies upon case law either dealing with personal
property assets, as in Worzala and Batra, or in cases involving real property acquired during
marriage, but deeded in the name of one party only, as in Stanger and Pringle. See, Worzala v.

Worzala, 128 Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (l 996); Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P.3d 889 (Ct.
App. 2001); Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho 1026, 712 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1985); Stanger v.

Stanger, 98Jdaho 725, 571 P.2d 1126-EJ-977), Upon review of Cargill, a case heavily relied upon by Kraly before tnedistrict court, it is unclear as to whether there was a deed in evidence
(as opposed to a contraet as discussed by the Cargill court); however, that court did not undergo
any analysis as directly relevant to the case at bar as that performed by the Hall court. Compare

Cargill v. Hancock, 92 Idaho 460 (!960) with Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 77 P.2d 255 (1989).
8

For example, the Kraly deed bears a striking similarity to the Hall deed; a deed whose
language was found by the Supreme Court to be unambiguous and therefore dispositive as to the
estate it conveyed to the community. The Kraly deed clearly and unambiguously granted a fee
simple estate to Kraly and Ahearn as husband and wife, therefore the only proper
characterization of the Lightning Creek is as a community asset in its entirety, as in Hall.
The Magistrate's characterization of the Lightning Creek property as a community asset
is based upon competent evidence, surmised from the unambiguous, express language of the
recorded deed. Pursuant to the Cargill court's standard of review the trial court characterization
must be upheld. Ahearn respectfully requests this Court to uphold the Ma.gistrate's
characterization of the acreage as a community asset. Ahearn further requests this Court, as a
matter of law, to award her a full and equal community share.
In an especially relevant passage to the case at bar, Judge Swl'!nstrom, in his Hall Court of
Appeals opinion, provided guidance as to the characterization of real property:
To overcome the community presumption the party named in the deed must present
evidence proving the separate source of the property. In cases where the deed names the
spouse, but does not indicate that the property is separate property, other evidence,
including parol evidence, is necessary. This parol evidence does not vary or contradict
the deed and is therefore admissible. However, where the deed names both spouses, as
husband and wife, the same parol evidence showing a separate interest necessarily
varies the deed. This evidence is barred by the parol ·evidence rule unless the rule is
inapplicable to a divorce case. In Suchan v. Suchan. l 06 Idaho 654, 682 P .2d 607
(1984), our Supreme Court applied the general rule of construction of an unambiguous
contract to an agreement between spouses involved in a divorce. We see no reason to
treat a deed differently. Our courts are not guided by a separate set of evidence rules in
divorce cases. A party seeking to rebut the presumption that property acquired during
marriage is community property must stand or fall on admissible evidence.
Hall, 112 at 643 (emphasis added); see also, Hall 116 Idaho 483,486 (1989) (wherein

9
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Judge Bistline's concurring opinion extensively quote's Judge Swanstrom's opinion).
Kraly's contention is based entirely upon evidence standing in stark contrast to the
express terms of the deed. Outside the deed itself, the record in this case only contains evidence
presented by Kraly tracing the source of the money for the purchase of the property and his
subjective recollection of the parties' intent when they bought their acreage. When faced with a
similar issue, the Hall court found:
The deed was clear and unambiguous as to the grantees and the estate conveyed.
Therefore, testimony claiming that the $40,000 'gift' was solely to the husband was in
reality an attempt not to clarify the amount of consideration but to vary other
unambiguous terms of the deed. When offered for this purpose, the testimony violated
the parol evidence rule.
Hall, 112 at 643.
On appeal before the district court, Kraly cited Hall as standing for the proposition that
Ahearn could not testify as to whether Kraly gifted the purchase of the Lightning Creek acreage.
App. Brief, pp 11 though pp. 12. However this is precisely what Kraly is trying to do by relying
on his subjective testimony to carry his onerous burden of proving the separate property nature
of the acreage. Any testimony as to the separate nature of the property directly contradicts the
deed, which is clearly parol evidence, and therefore inadmissible to prove the characterization ofthe property. The only admissible evidence on record that should speak to the parties' intention
is the deed itself, and as argued this deed unambiguously conveyed the property to the
community.
Kraly also argued on appeal before the district court the Lightning Creek property was
not transmuted from separate property to community property, as there was no evidence of a gift
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and any alleged transmutation did not meet the requisite formalities required by Idaho law.
Simply stated, this analysis is unnecessary under Hall and its progeny. The property was
presumptively community property when it was acquired during marriage and remained
community property when the deed was recorded in the community's name. As a matter of law
Ahearn should be awarded a full one-half community interest in the property.

D.

Should this Appellate Court not award Ahearn a full one-half community interest
in the property, this Court should affirm the trial court's characterization of the
asset and affirm Ahearn's remaining interest in the property.

If this Court is not willing to award Ahearn her full one-half community interest in the
Lightning Creek acreage, she would respectfully request the Court affirm Magistrate Judge
Julian's ruling. As argued herein, testimony regarding the source of the funds could only be
admissible if it finds the terms of the deed to be ambiguous.

If the language in the deed is ambiguous, then evidence of all the surrounding facts and
circumstances is admissible to prove the parties' intent. Gardner v. Fliegel, supra. The
parol evidence rule does not preclude the use of extrinsic evidence to explain the parties'
intent when the provisions of a writing are ambiguous. Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty,
Inc., 117Ariz.357,572P.2dl I 95(App. l 977). Hall, 1I 6 Idaho at 256.
As explained by Judge Swanstrom in Hall, an example would be the situation where real
property is acquired cturing th""marriage, but deeded in onl}cone party's name. The presumption
of community property would arise, but th~,e would be, for lack of a better term, an overt
ambiguity as to the parties' intent. Paro! e:vidence is then admissible so as to allow the trial court
to make a proper characterization of the property. Under Cargill, if the parol evidence is

11
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conflicting or subject to differing inferences, as argued infra, the characterization of the trial
court must stand, as long as it is based upon competent evidence. Cargill, 92 Idaho 460 (1960).
In this matter, parol evidence was properly admitted to explain the purchase of two other
pieces of property by Kraly during the course of his marriage to Ahearn. While acquired during
the marriage, the two properties, (Tr. Ct. Ex. Items 12, 13), were deeded to Kraly alone. He was
then able to properly bring in admissible parol evidence to prove they were indeed his separate
property. As stated by the Magistrate, the Lightning Creek property clearly stands in "a slightly
different position." (Tr., p. 178, L. 1.)
Regardless ofKraly's contention the Lightning Creek acreage is his separate property,
the record is replete with evidence of the parties intending to undergo the transaction to purchase
and hold acting as a community. By Kraly's own admission the parties had discussed
contributing to the property as a community. (Tr. p. 49, L. 19 - p. 50, L. 6; Tr. p. 94, L.14-16.)
The record indicates that Kraly paid for the taxes on the property, but there is no proof of what
the source of these payments were, and a reasonable presumption would be the payments were
made out of community income. (Tr. p. 50, L. 24 - p. 51, L.1.) The evidence shows the parties
actively sought out this property for purchase. (Tr. p. 49 line 18 through 23; Tr. p. 90 line 19
through p. 91 line 11.) Finally, !lie parties even hired an attorney together to pursue a lawsuit
over an undisclosed timber harvest. (Def. Ex. "C"; see also Tr. p. I 00 line 6 through p. 101 line
6.) Several times throughout his testimony, Kraly admits this property was community in nature.
(See, Tr., p. 107 line 23 through line 24.; p.110 lines 2 through line 25.) As Kraly stated," ... I

wanted to buy a piece of property that was mutually owned ... That was a piece of property for
12

my family to live on." (Tr. p. 130 line 22 through pp. 131 line 8.) It goes without saying Ahearn
believed the parties intention was to own the property as a community. (Tr. p. 134 line 1 through
pp. 135 line 16.)
As stated infra, and quoted at length the trial judge characterized the Lightning Creek
acreage as a community asset. This characterization must stand on appeal, as it quite clearly is
based upon the intentions of the parties to own the parcel as husband and wife. At the very least
Ahearn is entitled to what was awarded by the Magistrate and respectfully requests this Court to,
as an alternative to a full one-half community interest, affirm the Magistrate's decision.
On appeal, this Court may conclude that the Magistrate made insufficient findings of fact
to support the conclusion that Kraly failed to rebut the presumption that the Lightning Creek
property is community property.
I.R.C.P. 52(a) requires that a court make findings of fact and conclusions of!aw. Rule
52(a) states:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the
entry of an appropriate judgment; ... Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes
of review. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In the
application of this principle regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of those witnesses who appear personally before it.
Findings required by Rule 52(a) should lie clear, coherent, and complete while avoiding an
unnecessary review of the evidence. Vanderford Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 554, 165
P .3d 26 I, 268 (2007).

13
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In this matter, Ahearn does not contest that the Magistrate made findings of fact in its
oral pronouncement of its decision immediately following trial. Ahearn also does not contest the
absence of findings may be disregarded by an appellate court where the record is clear and yields
an obvious answer to the relevant question. See, Vanderford Co., Inc., v. Knudson, supra; see,
also, Pope v. lntermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,225,646 P.2d 988,996 (1982). However,

the purpose of the underlying rule is to "afford the appellate court a clear understanding of the
basis of the trial court's decision so that it might be determined whether the trial court applied
the proper law to the appropriate facts in reaching its ultimate judgment." Id.
In the event this Appellate Court cannot make a clear understanding of the basis for the
Magistrate's decision, Ahearn invites the Court to remand this matter for clarification by the
Magistrate.
II.

The Magistrate erred in concluding that Kraly was entitled to reimbursement of his
separate property funds used to purchase the property.

As set forth above, the distric_t court erred in setting aside the Magistrate's finding that the
Lightning Creek acreage was Kraly's separate property because there was substantial competent
evidence upon which the Magistrate could (and did) rely to establish the character of the
property. The Magistrate found the property to be a community property. However, upon
finding the acreage to be community property, the Magistrate held that Kraly was entitled to
recoup the funds he used to purchase the property, and then awarded the remaining value of the
property comprised of the natural increase in the value of the land as community property. In
doing this the Magistrate erred.

14
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In Idaho, it is clear that the natural increase in value of community property is of the
same character and is also community property. See, Stanger v. Stanger, 98 Idaho 725,571 P.2d
1126 (1977). Properly characterizing the Lightning Creek acreage as community property the
Magistrate was required to distribute the asset and the value of its natural increase in value onehalf each to Kraly and Ahearn.
III.

Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel Kraly is barred from asserting that Ahearn
possess no interest in the Lightning Creek acreage.
Even if this Appellate Court is to conclude that the Magistrate erred in finding the

Lightning Creek property a community property asset, and further erred in granting Ahearn a
one-half interest in the proceeds of the property above and beyond the purchase price Kraly paid
with his separate property, this Court should still affirm the Magistrate's ruling as to the division
of the Lightning Creek asset applying the doctrine of"judicial estoppel".
The doctrine of judicial estoppel, sometimes also known as the doctrine of preclusion of
inconsistent positions, "precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and
then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position ... " McKay v. Owens, 130
Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997) (citing, Risse/to v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local
343, 94 F.3d 597,600 (9 th Cir. 1996)).

In McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222, the Supreme Court set forth the
important policies behind the doctrine:
The policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are general considerations of
the orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings ....
Judicial estoppel is intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with the
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courts ... Because it is intended to protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an
equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.
130 Idaho at 152, 937 P.2d at 1226.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a party from taking one position on an issue in
the trial court and the opposite position on appeal. E.g., Fairmain v. District of Columbia, 934
A.2d 438 (Dist. of Columbia Ct. App. 2007); State v. Edwardsen, 430 N.W.2d 604 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988).
In the instant matter, judicial estoppel prohibits Kraly from being heard to complain that
the Magistrate erred in awarding Ahearn a one-half interest in the Lightning Creek Property less
the purchase price because that is the very interest Kraly stated Ahearn p~;;sessed in his sworn
testimony. At trial, Kraly admitted that Ahearn possessed an ownership interest in the property.
(Tr., p. 110, Ls. 23-25.) Though not taking into account his own one-half interest in the
appreciated value of the land, Kraly also testified that Ahearn's interest in the property was
whatever the property had appreciated in value Jess the diminution in value cause by the timber
harvest, and less the private money he put in to purchase the property coming from the sale of his
separate property, Palm City, Florida home. (Tr, p. 109, L. 11 - p. 110, L. 8.) Thus, by his
admissions at trial, Kraly has conceded that Ahearn possessed an interest in the Lightning Creek
property that was consistent with the Magistrate's decision in distributing the asset. By filing his
appeal and arguing to the district court -- and also this Court -- that Ahearn possesses no interest
in the property, Kraly is attempting to repudiate his prior acknowledgment that Ahearn possesses
an interest in the Lightning Creek acreage.
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For the protection of the dignity of judicial proceedings this Appellate Court should
exercise its discretion and bar Kraly from arguing on appeal the Magistrate erred in its division
of the Lightning Creek asset.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of fact and law, Ahearn is entitled to her full one-half interest in Lightning
Creek acreage. Clearly, the property was presumptively a community asset when it was
purchased during the parties' marriage, and it retained that characterization when the deed
conveyed the property in fee simple to "Stan Kraley and Susan Kraly, Husband and Wife".
The terms of the deed are unambiguous, and under Hall this Court_must give due
deference to the parties' intent as expressly stated. Accordingly, this Court must reverse the
decision of the district court finding the Lightning Creek property Kraly's separate property. In
the alternative, the record more than substantiates the Magistrate's characterization of the
property as a community asset, subject to a claim for the purchase price by Kraly.
Based upon the foregoing, Ahearn respectfully requests this Court reverse the decision of
the district court finding the Lightning Creek acreage Kraly's separate property and reverse the
decision of the Magistrate granting Kraly reimbursement for the purchase price of.the property,
or grant whatever relief it deems fair and just under the circumstances.
Dated this 27'h day of June 2008: --
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